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CHAPTER I
THE HISTORY OF RAILROADS
Early Developments
The first railroad for general transportation services in the
United States is generally considered to have been the Baltimore and
Ohio, which was opened in 1830. The first American steam locomotive was
tried out on the Baltimore and Ohio in 1830. It was called the "Tom Thumb"
and was built by Peter Cooper of New York. The primary purpose of this
early locomotive was to serve as a model to illustrate the practicability
of locomotives.
Earlier railroads had been powered by horses or mules and later by
stationary engines, especially in quarries and mines. These "tramways"
as they were called were developed upon the principle that "the resistance
offered by a wheeled vehicle when propelled over smooth rails is less
than that of a vehicle on the best of ordinary roads." However, the rapid
development of rail transportation hinged upon the development of the
steam locomotive. Most of these early railways were constructed for the
purpose of carrying coal from mines or granite from quarries and were not
intended to be general carriers of freight. The earliest of these tram-
ways was developed in 1807 and several more were in operation by 1830.
Steam driven locomotives were first developed in England. In 1804.
Richard Trevithick built a locomotive to run on rails which was able to
draw a ten ton load of iron nine miles at the rate of five and one-half
David Philip Locklin, Economics of Transportation (Homewood,
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., I960), p. 82.
miles per hour. Later in 1814 George Stephenson, also an Englishman,
built a locomotive which was able to move thirty tons over the rails at
a rate of four miles per hour. Stephenson then developed an improved
engine which was used on the first railroad to be opened in England for
the purpose of serving many shippers and carrying a wide variety of
2
freight. This road was opened in 1825 end was originally intended to
be open to all persons who wished to place their wagons and horses or
engines upon it, provided they paid the established tolls. However, the
railroad company soon found it necessary to take over the entire opera-
tion of the line.
Various groups in the United States became interested in the devel-
opment of the steam locomotive just prior to 1830 and several engines
were imported from England and operated on short lines in the United
States. The first American built engine began operation in 1830. These
first locomotives were quite small and primitive, but once the engines
were proved practicable, improvements were made quite rapidly.^ The impor-
tance of these advancements in the development of railroad transportation
cannot be overstated. Locklin states that "without the mechanical improve-
ments on locomotives, as well as on rolling stock and track, the railroads
could never have assumed the economic importance which they have attained."^
In 1833 there were 380 miles of railroad track in the United States.
By 1916 the total railroad mileage had grown to 254., 037. The peak in
railway mileage was reached in 1916. Since that time, total mileage in
2
Stuart Daggett, Principles of Inland Transportation (New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1955), p. 55.
'Xocklin, Economics of Transportation , p. 83.
Vbid.
operation has declined steadily. The following table illustrates the
total mileage in operation in the United States at ten year intervals
from 1830 to 1959.
TABLE 1.—Comparison of railroad mileage in the U.S, 1830-1959a
Year Mileage Year Mileage
1830 22 1900 193,34-6
1840 2,818 1910 240,293
1850 9,021 1920 252,845
1860 30,626 1930 249,052
1870 52,922 1940 233,670
1880 93,262 1950 223,779
1890 163,597 1959 217,565
tion
David Philip Locklin
(Homewood, Illinois:
. Economics
Richard D. 1
of Transoorta-
rwin, Inc.
,
I960), p. 84.
Much of the early railroad mileage was concentrated in the New Eng-
land region. By 1845 there were 710 miles of railroads with terminals in
Boston besides some outlying companies in Massachusetts and other New
England states. The main purpose of these early railroads was to provide
local transportation service between the larger cities and the surrounding
5
country.
'
The railroads later began to realize the potential of the longer
hauls. The Baltimore and Ohio had been founded for the purpose of even-
tually connecting Baltimore with the expanding markets of the Ohio and
'Daggett, Principles of Inland Transportation , p. 62.
Mississippi valleys. That purpose was accomplised in 1852 when the road
was completed to Wheeling, West Virginia. The final section of the rail-
road to St. Louis was completed in 1857, thus providing efficient over-
land transportation from Baltimore westward to the Mississippi River. In
1853 a stretch of road was opened between Cleveland and Toledo which com-
pleted continuous rail connections from Chicago to Buffalo and New York
City. This was the first New York to Chicago line. Several other rail-
roads were completed during the decade from 1850 to I860 which linked
various eastern cities with the markets of the West.
After the Civil War the railroads continued to expand even more
rapidly. In 1869 the first transcontinental line was completed when the
Union Pacific from the East was joined with the Central Pacific from the
West in Ogden, Utah. Railroad construction continued at a rapid pace all
through the 70 's except for a short interruption caused by the Panic of
1873, but the expansion in the 1880' s surpassed all other periods of
growth. More than 70,000 miles of railroad were constructed during the
ten year period from 1880 to 1890 including another transcontinental
route. Much of the expansion that took place was in the Far West. The
railroads were eager to connect the agricultural and mining resources of
the West to the industrial centers of the East in order to take advantage
of the transportation profits to be gained from the expanding trade
between the two sections. Another reason for the rapid construction of
railroads during this time period was the financial aid extended to the
railroads by various city and state governments as well as by the federal
government. These subsidies stimulated railroad building and brought
Locklin, Economics of Transportation , p. 85.
about a much more rapid expansion of the railway net than would otherwise
have been possible. This was the very reason for which the subsidies were
granted. The development of the railway system also aided in the more
rapid settlement of the undeveloped West. The railroads continued their
construction of new lines until 1916, though not at the same rapid pace
of the 1880's. In that year railroads reached an all-time high in mile-
age of line in operation in the United States. From that time to the
present, railroad mileage has declined steadily to 217,565.
State Regulation
The railroad transport system in the United States is made up
entirely of common carriers except for the limited facilities provided
by manufacturing companies. "That is they stand ready to serve all who
7
seek transportation on publicly announced terms at reasonable rates."
Railroads are really the only complete common carriers in the country
because they carry only the goods of others. The other modes of trans-
port in the United States, e.g. water, motor, and air, may be classified
under different situations as common carriers, contract carriers, pri-
vate carriers for hire, or private carriers for the firms which own them.
The main reasons for the common carrier status of railroads are
the technological conditions of railroad transport. The technical fea-
tures of railroads are such that particular lines must be operated as
individual units. I t is not possible to utilize individual motive units
as in motor or water transport, because of the fixity of rail lines over
which the vehicles move. 1 1 is not possible to open the railways to all
7
Dudley F. Pegrum, Transportation: Economics and Public Policy
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1963), p. 30.
6who wish to drive on them. The specialized facilities and the large
investment connected with railroad operation preclude over-all competi-
tion between rival suppliers of service.
The need for developing feasible routes between places led at the
outset of railroad development to the granting of the right of eminent
domain in acquiring rights of way and terminal facilities. The limited
competition which resulted along with the granting of other privileges
to railroads led to the idea that railroads were subject to the common
law idea of common carriage.
The growth of railroads in the middle of the nineteenth century
into the primary system of overland transportation led to comprehensive
g
regulation of the industry. The railroads had demonstrated their superi-
ority over other forms of transportation, except for certain waterways,
to such an extent that there was no good alternative to rail service.
"Because the railroads had monopolies at intermediate points and by con-
certed action often limited competition at others, rates were frequently
excessive; and there was discrimination against persons, points, and
traffic where competition was not effective."^ Therefore the original
reason for regulation was to curb railroad monopoly power in the interest
of small shippers, towns served by only one railroad, and other shipping
interests injured by monopolistic practices.
Agitation for railroad regulation was one of the primary parts of
the Granger movement of the late 1860 ? s and 1870 's. This movement was an
agrarian revolt brought about by low farm prices which resulted in hard-
^bid
.
Q
James G. Nelson, Railroad Transportation and Public Policy (Wash-
ington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1959), p. 112.
ship among the agricultural population. The complaints against railroads
were simply a part of the agitation of the Granger movement. The farmers
complained that freight rates were too high in relation to the low price
of farm products. They were angered at the gross discrimination practiced
by railroads, especially the discrimination which railroads practiced in
allowing preferential rates for some favored dealers and charging higher
rates to others. The results of the Granger agitation were the Granger
laws which were passed in Illinois, Iowa, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. The
purpose of the laws was to provide for the regulation of railroads includ-
ing the prescribing of maximum rates and the elimination of unlawful dis-
crimination. The Granger laws did not remain in effect for very long,
except in Illinois, but through various court tests they established the
validity of railroad regulation. They also provided a foundation upon
which later legislation could build. As Locklin put it: "The remarkable
thing was that these laws, modified in detail, were sound enough to
become the pattern for later legislation, both state and federal."
After the courts ruled on the validity of railroad regulation, many
of the states passed laws providing for such regulation. The states under-
took to regulate railroad operation within the state boundaries which
appeared to be within their authority. However, their power of regula-
tion of interstate rates was challenged in 1886 in the Supreme Court in
the Wabash, St. Louis, and Pacific Railway Company vs. Illinois. Rates
had been prescribed by the Illinois regulatory agency on shipments from
Gillman, Illinois to New York City in order to eliminate rate discrimina-
tion between that city and New York and Peoria and New York. The Supreme
Locklin, Economics of Transportation , p. 198.
Court said that the state had no jurisdiction in the matter since the
shipments were interstate in character, and under the constitution the
power to regulate interstate commerce had been delegated to the federal
government. This court decision made the enactment of a federal regula-
tory law necessary. In 1887 such a law was passed.
Federal Regulation
The Act to Regulate Commerce was approved by the President on
February 4., 1887 and became effective on April 5, 1887. The Act was
made applicable to all common carriers by railroad engaged in interstate
and foreign commerce. This meant practically all railroads since even
intrastate roads engage in some interstate commerce. The Act did not
apply to common carriers wholly by water, but it included common carriers
partly by rail and partly by water when the two were used under common
control or management for continuous shipment. Daggett presents a good
summary of the law.
1. The Act applied to transportation in interstate and foreign
commerce.
2. The Act declared that:
a. All rates must be reasonable.
b. Undue preference to persons or to localities was for-
bidden.
c. It was unlawful to charge more for shorter than for
longer hauls
.
d. Tariffs must be filed, published, and adhered to.
e. Railroads were to supply facilities for the interchange
of traffic with connecting lines.
3. A commission was set up.
U. The Commission was given power to enforce the provisions
of the Act. It could require reports from carriers, and
had some jurisdiction over accounts.
This was the long-and-short-haul provision against railroad rate
discrimination which had been one of the main issues prior to passage of
the law and which has caused considerable controversy in recent years
over railroads attempts to meet truck competition by selective rate cut-
ting.
12
5. Commission orders were to be enforced through the courts.
Locklin stated that the general results of the Act to Regulate
Commerce were very good although several weaknesses did appear. There
were several laws passed between 1887 and 1920 which attempted to correct
those weaknesses. One of the most important of these was the Hepburn
Act in 1906. The Act to Regulate Commerce had provided that all rates
should be just and reasonable and those which were not just and reasonable
were unlawful. The Interstate Commerce Commission had assumed that where
rates were found unjust and unreasonable it had the power to prescribe
reasonable rates. However, the Supreme Court stated in 1896 that the
Commission was not given that power by the law. The Hepburn Act remedied
this problem by granting the Interstate Commerce Commission the power to
prescribe maximum rates. The law had several other provisions such as
giving the Commission power to prescribe joint rates, increasing their
power to control discrimination and making Commission orders binding on
13
the carrier without the necessity of court action.
In December, 1917, eight months after the United States had entered
World War I, the railroads were taken over by the government. They were
operated by the United States Railroad Administration during the war and
until March 1, 1920. When the railroads were returned to private owner-
ship a law was passed to aid in the transition and to improve United
States regulation policy. The law which resulted was the Transportation
Act of 1920. The Act extended the system of control over railroads,
increased the Commission's power, and radically changed the policies of
12
' Daggett, Principles of Tnland Transportation , p. 615.
13
Lcoklin, Economics of Transportation , pp. 213-217.
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regulation which had been followed up to that time.
Regulation prior to World War I had been aimed primarily at enforc-
ing competition within the industry and protecting the public against
monopoly powers. Regulation had been restrictive in its approach. The
Congress realized in the Act that conditions had changed since the first
laws of regulation were passed in 1887 and railroads were no longer the
financial giants that they had been. When the railroads were returned
to private ownership there would be a need for rate increases in order to
maintain efficient railroad transportation. The Interstate Commerce Com-
mission was given the responsibility of providing railroads an opportunity
to earn adequate income. The railroads were placed under "the fostering
guardianship and control of the Commission." ^
Therefore, the dominant purpose of the entire Transportation Act of
1920 "was the promotion of an adequate system of transportation for the
15
country." ^ In order to accomplish this purpose the law provided a rule
of rate making section for the Interstate Commerce Commission to follow.
The section provided that the Interstate Commerce Commission should pre-
scribe just and reasonable rates which would allow carriers under honest,
efficient and economical management to earn a fair rate of return on the
aggregate value of railway property. The Commission was left to deter-
'
mine from time to time what should be considered a fair rate of return,
but the Congress did prescribe a rate of 5'h per cent for the first two
years that the section was in force. This section applied to carriers as
a whole not on individual railroads so that there was to be a fair rate
1 4Ibid .. p. 228.
Ibid.
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of return on the aggregate property of all railroads. Although the word-
ing of this section has been changed, it still remains a very important
part of the Interstate Commerce Act. Another significant part of the
Act was the provision which empowered the Commission to prescribe minimum
rates. The delegation of this power is evidence of a change in the policy
of enforced competition. This power was to be used in preventing rate
wars and the undermining of the rate level prescribed under the rule of
rate making. There were other provisions in the Act of 1920 but they are
too numerous to mention here. Suffice it to say that they generally
extended the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission in regulating
railroads.
After the amendments of 1920 the Interstate Commerce Act remained
unmodified for several years. However, changing conditions and the par-
tial failure of the Transportation Act to work out as Congress had planned,
necessitated the various amendments which have been inacted since 1920.
The following is a list of legislation affecting railroad regulation
since 1920 in chronological order: (1) the Hoch-Smith Resolution, (2) the
Railway Labor Act, (3) Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, (40 the Emergency
Transportation Act of 1933, (5) the Transportation Act of 194-0, (6) the
Railroad Modification Act, (7) the Reed-Dulwinkle Act, and (8) the Trans-
portation Act of 1958.-1-° Though all of these amendments and acts had
certain significant applications, only the most important will be dis-
cussed here to point out the general development of railroad regulation.
The Hoch-Smith Resolution was passed in 1925 and was introduced
and backed by the farm bloc. Congress anticipated that this legislation
l6Ibid., p. 239
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would relieve the agricultural distress which existed. There is no doubt
that the purpose of the law was to induce the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion to prescribe the lowest possible lawful rates on the products of
agriculture affected by the depression. The provisions of the law were:
(1) The Interstate Commerce Commission was directed in prescribing freight
rates to take into consideration "the conditions which at any given time
prevail in our several industries ... in so far as it is legally pos-
sible to do so, to the end that commodities may freely move." (2) The
Commission was directed to make a thorough investigation of the rate
structure and remove any unreasonable, unjust and unduly discriminatory
rates that existed. (3) In making rate adjustments the Interstate Com-
merce Commission was to consider three factors: (a) general and compara-
tive market value of the various commodities as indicated over a reason-
able number of years, (b) a natural and proper development of the country
in general, (c) the maintenance of an adequate system of transportation.
(4.) The Commission, in view of the existing depression in agriculture,
was directed to establish on agriculture products the lowest possible
lawful rates compatible with the maintenance of an adequate transporta-
tion system.
The Grain Rate Structure Investigation by the Interstate Commerce
Commission, which will be discussed later, was a direct result of this
Resolution.
The immediate purpose of the Emergency Transportation Act of 1933
was to deal with the crisis with which railroads were faced due to the
depression. The provisions of the law which dealt with the railroad
Ibid.
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emergency were temporary in nature. The other provisions of the law were
permanent amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act. The most important
of those provisions was the amendment to the rule of rate making. The
Congress repealed the old rule of rate making and substituted a new rule
which stated that in prescribing rates the Interstate Commerce Commission
should consider the following: the effects of rates on the movement of
traffic, the need in the public interest of adequate and efficient trans-
portation service at the lowest possible cost, and the need of carrier
revenues sufficient to provide such service under honest, efficient, and
18
economical management. This new rule of rate making left out the por-
tion stating that railroads should have revenues sufficient to provide a
fair rate of return on aggregate property. The Commission was directed
instead to prescribe rates which would allow carriers to provide adequate
and efficient transportation service. The Commission was also directed
to take into consideration the effect of rates on the movement of traffic.
The most important part of the Transportation Act of 1940 was the
declaration of a national transportation policy. Congress apparently
felt that it was necessary to provide the Interstate Commerce Commission
with a general expression of policy which it expected them to follow in
regulating the various modes of transportation which had come under the
authority of the Commission. The reason for this was the passage of the
Motor Carrier Act in 1935 which brought motor carriers under Interstate
Commerce Commission jurisdiction and the Act of 1940 which included water
carriers under their jurisdiction.
The declaration of policy provided the Commission with the general
considerations which were to govern their regulation of the different
1 O
Pegrum, Transportation: Economics and Public Policy , p. 320.
uagencies subject to Interstate Commerce Commission jurisdiction. The
declaration of policy was a recognition on the part of Congress that
henceforth successful regulation would have to consider the problems of
competition between the different modes of transportation. The declara-
tion of policy reads as follows:
It is hereby declared to be the national transportation
policy of the Congress to provide for fair and impartial regu-
lation of all modes of transportation subject to the provisions
of the Act, so administered as to recognize and preserve the
inherent advantages of each; to promote safe, adequate, eco-
nomical, and efficient service and foster sound economic con-
ditions in transportation and among the several carriers ; to
encourage the establishment and maintenance of reasonable
charges for transportation services, without unjust discrimina-
tions, undue preferences of advantages, or unfair or destruc-
tive competitive practices; to cooperate with the several
States and the duly authorized officials thereof, and to
encourage fair wages and equitable working conditions ; . . .
all to the end of developing, coordinating, and preserving a
national transportation system by water, highway, and rail,
as well as other means, adequate to meet the needs of the
commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of
the national defense. All of the provisions of this Act shall
be administered and enforced with a view to carrying out the
above declaration of policy. -*•'
The Transportation Act of 1958 was passed after extensive hearings
in both the House and Senate on the deteriorating railroad situation.
In addition to providing aid to financially distressed railroads the
Act dealt with specific difficulties which the railroads had encountered
in their efforts to adjust rates and services to new conditions brought
about by the growth of competitive modes of transportation. The rule of
rate making in Section 159 was again amended, this time by the addition
of a paragraph as follows:
In a proceeding involving competition between carriers
of different modes of transportation subject to this Act, the
Commission, in determining whether a rate is lower than a
-^Locklin, Economics of Transportation , p. 250.
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reasonable minimum rate, shall consider the facts and circum-
stances attending the movement of the traffic by the carrier
or carriers to which the rate is applicable. Rates of a
carrier shall not be held up to a particular level to protect
the traffic of any other mode of transportation, giving due
consideration to the objectives of the national transportation
policy declared in this Act.20
The purpose of this addition was to prevent the Commission from
holding up the rates of one mode of transportation in order to protect
the rates of another mode.
20Pegrum, Transportation: Economics and Public Safety , p. 326.
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CHAPTER II
THE GRAIN RATE STRUCTURE
Historical Development
The movement of grain has been historically determined by the loca-
tion of the terminal markets which serve as storing and processing centers
and by the natural flow of goods east and west. As the country developed
it became economical for grain producers to locate in the more remote
areas and on less intensively cultivated land. Before 1850, when water
borne carriers were the primary means of transportation, most of the
terminal markets were located on an east-west line along the Ohio and
Potomac Rivers. The primary markets were St. Louis, Cincinnati, Wheeling,
Philadelphia, and Baltimore. Through these markets the surplus grain and
hog products moved to the East and South. Wheat and livestock products
also moved from Chicago over the Great Lakes to Buffalo and eastern con-
suming points. When the railroads pushed on west of the Mississippi
River the basic east-west flow of commodities continued but the line of
important terminal markets shifted to a north-south axis, taking on the
pattern they have today. The principal terminal markets along the north-
south axis are: Minneapolis, Chicago, Omaha, Denver, St. Louis, Kansas
City, and Fort Worth. 21
The development of the Plains states as a surplus grain producing
area paralleled the developments of these markets. The climate, soils,
and location of these states made them well suited for the production of
21
United States Department of Agriculture, Yearbook of Agriculture
.
19 54-: Marketing (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing
Office, 1954), p. 37.
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wheat and other grains. The primary surplus wheat producing region
stretches northward from the Panhandle of Texas and Oklahoma to North
Dakota and Minnesota. The earlier movements of grain were from these
states eastward through the terminal markets to the East. Therefore,
the early structure of grain rates was based primarily on the movement
of wheat into the various terminal markets and thence on to the East.
The railroads established rates on the movement of grain from a
particular point on their line to a terminal market and certain rates
on grain from the terminal market to the various consuming points in the
East. The main characteristic of the resulting rate structure was that
railroads published flat rates on grain products into the terminal mar-
kets, where shippers were granted transit privileges, and then the grain
moved on to the eastern markets at a proportional rate or on a transit
balance.
A transit balance was the difference between an established over-
head through rate from the originating point to the final destination and
the flat rate at which the shipment was billed into the terminal market.
This principle for determining grain rates is known as the rate break
principle and will be discussed more fully in the following section in
connection with the grain freight rate investigation by the Interstate
Commerce Commission.
The Grain Rate Structure Investigation
With the passage of the Hoch-Smith Resolution in 1925, the Congress
directed the Interstate Commerce Commission to investigate the railroad
rate structure to determine the reasonableness of rates on agricultural
commodities. The study on grain and grain products was known as the
18
Rate Structure Investigation, Part VII and was concerned with rates in
the western district and for export. Although the investigation included
all grain rates, most of the discussion centered around wheat since wheat
shipments make up a large portion of the grain transported by railroads.
The hearings in this case were conducted in the summer of 1928 and were
completed in September of that year. The Commission did not make its
final decision until 1930.
The following is a discussion and summary of the Interstate Commerce
Commission report presented in the case. The main issues in the case are
covered as well as the final decisions of the Commission. However, the
summary is necessarily sketchy since, as the Commission stated, the case
embraced "three score and more of major issues" and it involved more than
22
seventy thousand pages of testimony and briefs. *
The Commission stated at the outset that the question presented in
this case is whether, under existing conditions, "the rates on grain and
grain products throughout the western district are reasonable and just and
23
are properly related to each other and to the rates on other traffic." ^
The Interstate Commerce Commission further pointed out that the question
embraces comparisons of distance, transportation conditions, and ton-mile
earnings and car-mile earnings on grain in relation to other commodities
as well as the question regarding whether the general rate level is suf-
ficient to provide the carriers with a fair rate of return as contemplated
by law. The Commission stated that the fair rate of return as construed
22
United States, Interstate Commerce Commission, Reports . "Rate
Structure Investigation, Part VII," CLXIV (1931), 697.
23
Ibid., p. 627.
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in Section 15a of the Interstate Commerce Act was 5.1%, This is the rate
which is to be permitted but not necessarily guaranteed on the fair value
of the property which is devloted to the transportation service.
The hearing then considered the rates of return on all railroads in
the western district for the period 1921-1928. The railroads showed a
steady increase from 3.12% in 1921 to 4.35% in 1928.
The Commission also considered evidence indicating the importance
of grain and grain products for carriers in the western district. Grain
and grain products revenue provided 12.1% of total revenues for carriers
in the western district in 1924-. For the calendar year 1927 grain and
grain products constituted 11.6% of tons originated and 10.12% of tons
carried for all class I railroads in the western district. Therefore, it
is concluded that grain and grain products are of considerable importance
to railroads in the western district.
In order to have a general understanding of the grain marketing
structure of the country, the Commission reviewed the production and flow
of wheat in the United States. The Report stated that the average pro-
duction of wheat in the United States is 800 million bushels of which
200 million are exported. The surplus of United States wheat production
is west of the Missouri River. The harvest of this wheat crop begins in
May in the winter wheat belt of Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, Colorado, and
Southern Nebraska and extends through October in the spring wheat region
—
Montana, the Dakotas, and Minnesota. The heaviest movement of wheat
occurs in the three month period after harvest. Most of the wheat moves
to market and milling points such as Denver, Wichita, and Fort Worth and
to the primary markets such as Kansas City, Duluth, Minneapolis, Sioux
City, Omaha, St. Louis and Chicago. Wheat received at these markets may
20
be promptly milled or resold or possibly stored to be sold later. The
general flow of wheat and wheat products is to the East. However, much
grain, especially for export flows southward to the gulf and a large
percentage of the wheat produced in Washington and Oregon goes to export-
ers and millers in Seattle, Portland, Tacoma and other Puget Sound Ports.
For the wheat that moves east there are three primary routes. The wheat
from the northern tier of states moves through Duluth and Minneapolis and
thence over the Great Lakes to various eastern points. During the time
of the year when shipping is closed on the lakes the wheat moves through
Chicago over rails and then eastward. The wheat produced in the central
states such as Kansas and Colorado moves through the Missouri River gate-
ways and Chicago or St. Louis to the East. It is widespread practice by
railroads to allow grain shippers to stop carloads of grain at various
market and milling points for storage or processing before continuing on
to the final destination. There is no extra charge for this service.
It is referred to as a transit privilege and is used extensively by many
shippers.
There are three different methods of determining rates to and from
primary markets. They are: (1) a combination of flat rates in and out
of the market, (2) a combination of flat rates in and proportional rates
out, and (3) overhead rates with transit. The Interstate Commerce Com-
mission gave the definition of these terms as used in the investigation.
A flat rate is essentially either a local rate of a single carrier or a
joint rate of two or more carriers and it is not dependent for application
on any previous shipment of the grain or any subsequent shipment.
A proportional rate is a local or joint rate which is dependent for
its application on (1) a previous transportation by railroad to the point
21
from which the proportional rate applies, (2) a subsequent transportation
from the point to which the proportional rate applies, or (3) both of
these conditions. It is supposed to be a part of a through rate and is
therefore, usually lower than the flat rate between the same two points.
An ex lake proportional is a rate applicable at lower lake ports
on shipments which have previously been transported across the Great
Lakes.
An overhead rate with transit is a rate under which shipments may
be stopped at an intermediate point for any recognized transit purpose.
In the absence of such a rate the charge would be the lowest combination
of applicable rates to and from the transit point.
Sometimes overhead through rates are published through primary
markets on a basis other than the flat rate to the market and the pro-
portional rate beyond. If these rates were higher than the combination
rates they would violate the long- and- short-haul provision of Section
Four of the Interstate Commerce Act, so they are usually the same or
lower than combination rates. If they are lower than the overhead one
factor rate would take precedence over the combination rates due to an
earlier ruling by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
All shipments to markets are billed in at flat rates. If the
inbound freight bill was from a point which had an established overhead
rate to the destination point then the outbound rate would be the balance
between the total overhead rate and the inbound flat rate already paid.
This is called the transit balance. If the inbound freight bill was from
a point with no overhead rates then the outbound shipment would be billed
at the proportional rate.
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One of the main issues in this case revolved around the problem of
using proportional rates or overhead rates with transit. The proportional
rates had apparently fallen into disuse for a time preceding this hearing
because railroads had established overhead rates which took precedence.
The use of these overhead rates had not disrupted in many cases the estab-
lished rate break equalization of routes and market gateways but had the
effect of decreasing the importance of the rate break principle.
The primary objection to the rate break seemed to be that the pro-
portional rate could not always be a reasonable addition to all inbound
freight rates. This is especially true of the long-haul inbound traffic.
In other words if the inbound flat rates for long hauls were continued on
to the point of destination at the normal rate of progression used on a
distance scale they would be lower than the flat rate to the primary
market plus the proportional rate to the final destination. Thus most of
those objecting to the proportional rate were long-haul shippers and var-
ious state commissions and they generally had no objection to rate breaks
at principal markets if the volume of such rates did not exceed a reason-
able overhead rate level.
On the other hand there were many witnesses who strongly favored the
maintenance of the rate break principles. This group included some ship-
pers and state commissions and representatives of the various primary
markets. The principal markets such as Kansas City argued that the main-
tenance of rate breaks was important as a stimulator of the futures market,
since the more grain that can move through a given market, the more
representative the price will be.
The Interstate Commerce Commission stated that it was evident that
the flat rate to the market and proportional rate beyond would preserve
and substantially increase the railroad's revenue.
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The Interstate Commerce Commission concluded that the dual system
of rates on grain could not be continued. It also pointed out that the
transit balance at primary markets due to overhead rates had always been
a source of disorganization of rates. The Commission gave several examples
of cases where this had been the problem. As stated in the Report : "The
best interests not only of the primary markets, but of the producer, con-
sumer, and carrier will be served by the fullest possible application of
the rate break combinations through primary markets." *
The Commission therefore ordered that all overhead through rates
less than the flat rate and proportional rate combinations as later pre-
scribed in this report should be cancelled.
The Commission then turned its attention to the general level of
grain rates. The Report stated that it was evident that some rates were
too high while others were too low. Therefore, any horizontal treatment
of rates would simply perpetuate those inconsistencies. The Commission
then chose to deal with individual rate changes in order to correct the
disparities which existed. The method used was to determine a reasonable
through rate first and then where the. rate went through a primary market
to break the rate down into flat rates to the primary markets and pro-
portional rates beyond. The resulting proportional rates were better
proportioned to the inbound flat rates than under the previous adjustment.
The Commission then proceeded to prescribe the just rates to which
they had referred. The rates which were prescribed were generally rate
reductions although as the Report mentioned there were some rate increases
in order to obtain a more equitable and harmonious rate structure for
2
^Ibid.. p. 645.
2U
grain and grain products. The Commission listed the prescribed rates
from various production points to primary markets. A scale of rates was
also provided which was to be applied on various interior movements for
which specific rates were not provided. The prescribed rates covered
the movements of grain from the most important production points in all
the surplus grain states in the western district to the primary market.
The Commission ruled that the rates on wheat and coarse grains would be
the same. The following table shows the rates effective prior to the
grain rate investigation as well as the rates prescribed by the Commission
in that case for shipments from various points in Kansas to Kansas City
and Chicago.
These rate changes are indicative of the changes prescribed by the
Commission in the western district. The Interstate Commerce Commission
Reoort pointed out that the commissioners in making their decision had
considered all of the mandates of the law affecting rate relations, the
natural development of the country as a whole, and the maintenance of an
adequate transportation system. In emphasizing the importance of rate
relations they said:
As previously stated, the greater part of the evidence
and the chief contentions centered around wheat. In some
respects, in a traffic sense, wheat is the most liquid com-
modity known in transportation. The classes or grades of
wheat have long been standardized and, commercially, wheat
approximates currency. The rate structure should permit it
to move freely in all directions. Rates on wheat are closely
related to one another, and even a slight change in one will
ordinarily affect the movement governed by the others. In
fact, generally speaking, all the rates on wheat may be likened
to a huge blanket covering the entire country, and a pull on
any part of this blanket to the extent of 1 or 2 cents, some-
time
s
?
even a fraction of a cent, will be felt in every other
part.
The prescribed rates went into effect on August 1, 1931.
25
Ibid.
, p. 697.
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Further Revisions
Prior to the grain rate investigation in 1923 the general economic
outlook had been good. Railroad earnings climbed steadily from 1921
through 1923. The country had been in a boom period. However, during
the time while the Interstate Commerce Commission was considering the
evidence the trend completely reversed itself. By the time the Commis-
sion reached a final decision on the grain rate structure a depression
was well on its way. By the end of 1930 the railroads were hard hit by
drastic reductions in traffic and resulting low revenues. They felt they
were being hit while down by the reduction in grain rates which was to go
into effect in 1931. Their return in investment had already been pared
to about % and the rate reduction was sure to lower the rate of return
26
even more.
The railroads therefore, petitioned the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion for further hearings to bring the record up to date and to show that
economic conditions were such, as reflected by national depression, that
ohe original order by the Commission was unresponsive to current condi-
tions. The Interstate Commerce Commission denied the request and the
railroads took it to the Supreme Court. On February 20, 1932, the tariffs
reflecting the revised grain rates were cancelled by a Supreme Court
decision requiring vacation of the order due to the denial by the Inter-
state Commerce Commission of petitions for further hearings.
Thus, the Interstate Commerce Commission reopened the hearings.
Much of the testimony heard in this case was a restatement of earlier
testimony. The railroads presented evidence to indicate the effects of
"Grain Rate Issue Widens Rift Between Railroads and ICC, "J&gi-
ness Week . October 22, 1930, p. 14-.
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depression on railroad earnings. The shippers and other protestants
argued that all industries had been equally affected and the railroads
should bear their share of the burden of depression.
The western railroads presented evidence which showed that their
rate of return on investment dropped from 5.06$ in 1929 to 3.55$ in 1930
to 2..2.1& in 1931 and finally to .91$ in 1932. The railroads emphasized
the inroads of track transportation into their traffic and argued that
the rate reductions and depression not only endangered their revenues
but interfered with their attempts to meet this competition in the most
effective way by applying reductions where competition was most prevalent
and maintaining or increasing rates in less competitive areas.
On the other hand evidence was presented that indicated that grain
producers had also been hard hit by depression. Their prices received
had been declining steadily from the time of the earlier hearings until
the summer of 1933 when they recovered slightly, but they were still
drastically low. Freight costs went from 9.8$ of the value of grain in
1925 to 4-0$ of the value of grain in March, 1933.
The Interstate Commerce Commission in giving its decision reaffirmed
its earlier decision that grain rates should be determined exclusively by
the application of rate break combinations. The Commission also stated
that there had been some criticism of the interior scale which had been
prescribed for determining rates between points other than those with
established or prescribed key-point rates. The Commission conceded that
the real necessity for the scale was doubtful since rates are generally
available for shipments in the direction of the normal flow of grain
traffic. Therefore, the prescription of an interior scale was rescinded
in this case.
29
The Commission asserted that it was clear that the reductions granted
in all but the western trunk line territory of the western district were
too drastic in view of the existing conditions and upon comparison of
rate levels in the respective rate territories. The rates which were,
therefore, prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission were somewhat
lower than the rates had been prior to the earlier hearing, but were a
little higher than the rates prescribed in that case. The following
table shows the rates prescribed along with previous rates from points in
Kansas to Chicago and Kansas City.
These rates are again indicative of the general level of rates pre-
scribed for all of the western district, except the western trunk line
territory where the rates prescribed earlier were not changed. The Com-
mission further stipulated in its findings that rates from points other
than those prescribed by the Commission should be constructed by railroads
to indicate a reasonable relation to the rates from neighboring key points
prescribed in the Interstate Commerce Commission Report .
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CHAPTER III
CHANGES IN GRAIN RATES, 1930-1960
Pre-World War II Increases
During the ten year period from 1920 to 1929 railroads experienced
extremely favorable operating conditions. They had been granted large
rate increases when returned to private ownership in 1920. This coupled
with the increased economic activity and resulting increased transporta-
tion demands of the twenties provided railroads with large operating
revenues. As a result, the railroads were able to invest large sums in
new equipment and other improvements and still increase their corporate
surplus by about 76$ during the period.
However, by the end of 1930 the railroads were feeling the effects
of the depression. Traffic and earnings fell off sharply in 1930. The
volume of traffic continued to decline in the early part of 1931 and in
June of that year the railroads petitioned the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission for the authority to increase their rates by 15$ in order to
deal with the problem of declining revenues. The Interstate Commerce
Commission considered the increase in The Fifteen Per Cent Case, 1931.
The railroads stated that their rate of return in 1930 had fallen to
3.54$ and based on the first six months of operation, the estimated rate
of return for 1931 was 2.25$. They argued that this low rate of return
would endanger their credit. They also argued that since they were a
publicly regulated industry they were not able to enjoy prosperous times
27
United States, Interstate Commerce Commission, Reports . "The
Fifteen Per Cent Case, 1931," CLXXVIII (1932), 567.
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to the same extent as other industries in order to make up for lean years
such as 1930.
The protestants in the case included just about every branch of
agriculture as well as industry. They expressed the opinion that an
increase in rates would be harmful to the nation and to railroads. They
argued that all industries were equally affected by depression. In fact,
most industries, and especially agriculture, had experienced a violent
drop in prices received for their products while railroads had experienced
no such decline in the price of their services. The protestants also
argued that an increase in freight rates would allow the railroad's com-
petitors to take over still more of their traffic.
The findings of the Commission were that no general increase should
be granted at that time. Specific emergency increases were authorized on
a few commodities for a limited time but these did not affect most agri-
cultural products. In its conclusion the Commission stated:
The facts set forth above show beyond question that there
are elements of plain peril to the railroads in such an increase
in freight rates as they propose at the present time. The
chief dangers are (1) that at a time when transportation costs
are of vital consequence to every industry it will stimulate
new competitive forces already rapidly developing, (2) that it
will alienate or impair the friendly feeling toward the rail-
roads on the part of the people of the country which is essen-
tial to adequate legislation for their protection and the
proper regulation of all forms of transportation in the public
interest, and (3) that it will disturb the business conditions
of an already shell-shocked industry, and accelerate the
tendency toward a localization of production. It should be
borne in mind that traffic once lost to a competitive agency
is far more difficult to regain than it is to hold before it
is lost. 2^
The Commission recommended slight rate increases in the industries
best able x.o stand it as a temporary measure of relief for railroads.
28Ibid., p. 575.
3/+
As the depression deepened, it became apparent to most shippers
that freight rates were well out of line with commodity prices. At the
end of 1932 commodity prices had fallen to a level 17% below the pre-war
level while freight rates were about 50% above pre-war levels. ° An
article in Business Week in 1933 stated that the public had made up its
30
mind that "freight rates are too high and must come down."^ Although
railroad revenues were quite low due to decreased traffic, the various
shipping interests felt that rates should be reduced to match, at least
to some extent, the reduction in commodity prices. Therefore, on January
25, 1933 several farm organizations representing farmers and other ship-
ping interests filed a petition with the Interstate Commerce Commission
asking for an investigation of the general rate level and requesting that
the Commission enter an order reducing freight rates. The shippers argued
that the disparity between freight rates and commoiity prices was hinder-
ing the free movement of traffic and retarding economic recovery. The
railroads asserted that their revenues were already drastically low and
any reduction in rates would be hazardous.
The Commission stated in the findings of the case that railroads
had been losing increased amounts of traffic to competing carriers and
had been forced in many cases to reduce rates drastically to meet that
competition. In the opinion of the Commission a general rate reduction
would not aid railroads in that competition nor would it bring about an
increase in the volume of business or cause increased consumption in the
economy. Therefore, no rate reductions were ordered.
29
United States, Interstate Commerce Commission, Reports . "The
Fifteen Per Cent Case, 1931," CXCI (1933), 377.
p. 13.
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"Freight Rates Must Come Down," Business Week . February 8, 1933,
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The Commission emphasized again the inroads of truck transportation.
1 1 stated that in 1931 it was thought that truck competition would be
primarily on short hauls and on less than carload freight and not of any-
great consequence. But by 1933, both of these beliefs had been disproved
by trucks taking over vast quantities of less than carload freight and
moving it long distances. Before truck competition, railroads had been
able to charge what the traffic would bear on different commodities, with
low grade commodities having low rates and high grade commodities having
high rates. A large part of railroad earnings were from high grade com-
modities. But with increased competition, much of the high grade traffic
was being handled by other carriers or by railroads at little or no profit.
The Commission stated that adequate and efficient railway transportation
service "cannot be maintained if the cream of railroads traffic is taken
by competitors and if we require reductions on the traffic not subject to.
competition. "^ The Commission asserted that if the carriers could not
pay their way and make a reasonable profit there was no incentive for
continuing the service. However, the opinion of the Commission was that
32
"the country is not ready to abandon its railroads"^ and therefore, the
duty of the Commission was to follow the course which presented the great-
est promise in maintaining the efficient railroad mileage of the country.
The opinion of the Commission was that general rate reductions would tend
to defeat that end.
In August of 1934, the railroads petitioned the Interstate Commerce
Commission for authority to increase their rates by 10%, subject to cer-
31
United States, Interstate Commerce Commission, reports . 'General
Rate Level Investigation, 1933," CXCV (1933), 71.
32j bid
. , p . 71
.
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tain maxima and exceptions. Some commodities would be subject to a flat
increase while others would be exempt from increase. In other instances
increased rates were proposed only for longer hauls which were not sub-
ject to truck competition. According to an editorial in Business Week
these rate increases would only amount to about a 6.8% increase by the
time the maxima and exceptions were considered. The article stated that
this increase would be "no great tax" on business and that the resulting
revenue would allow railroads to reduce their deficit below the %5U mil-
lion level forecasted for 1934.
Farmers and other shippers protested the increase on the same basis
as in previous cases since the beginning of the depression. They pointed
out that the disparity between commodity prices and freight rates still
existed and any rate increases would force shippers to turn to competing
modes of transportation. The Secretary of Agriculture, at the reauest of
the Commission, presented a report on the agricultural situation. After
considering the report, the Commission was forced to the conclusion as
they were in 1931 that the agricultural industry was in worse shape than
railroads. Therefore, in granting temporary increases of 1% on carload
freight and 10% on less than carload freight, the Commission excluded
agricultural commodities.
In its discussion of the case, the Commission once again emphasized
the change that was coming over the railroad industry due to truck com-
petition. It pointed out "that a railroad rate structure which was well
adapted to the conditions of fifteen or twenty years ago is not necessar-
33
-^"Rail Rates," Business Week . September 1, 1934, p. 10.
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3/
ily well adapted to the conditions which prevail today." The Commission
continued to state that the emergency increases granted in this case were
a dangerous and inadequate method of dealing with these problems. In fact,
in many instances, more might be gained by reducing rates than by increas-
ing them. The Commission suggested that railroads should alter their
equipment and services in every feasible way in order to lower operating
costs. The Commission also suggested that railroads should make detailed
studies of the rate structure "for the purpose of discovering where it
repels or impedes traffic, where reductions can be made which will, by
their effect on traffic, increase aggregate revenues, and where increases
35
are possible which industry and traffic can bear without harm." The
increased rates became effective on April 18, 1935. The increase granted
by the Commission was an emergency provision and the authority to main-
tain the increase was to expire in June of 1936.
In January of 1936 the railroads asked the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission to continue the emergency rate increases without an expiration
date. They argued that even though traffic was increasing and their
revenues were improving the emergency increases were still needed. The
shippers protested that the emergency which had existed when the rates
were granted was no longer prevalent. The Commission granted a six-
month extension of the rates and told railroads to begin to revise their
rates to more perfectly fit the economic conditions. The extension of
Jnited States, Interstate Commerce Commission, Reports . 'Emergency
Freight Charges, 1935," CCVIII (1935), 62.
35Ibid.. p. 63.
•3/1
United States, Interstate Commerce Commission, Reports . 'Emergency
Freight Charges, 1935," CCXV (1936), U31-U1U.
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the emergency rates and the increased traffic which accompanied the general
economic upturn of 1936 allowed the railroads to earn a profit for the
first time since 1931. In October of 1936 the railroads again asked the
Commission to extend the increase. The petition was denied and the emer-
37
gency rate increases were allowed to expire on December 31, 1936.
Before the expiration of the emergency increase, the railroads filed
a petition asking for rate increases on certain commodities. The Commis-
sion concluded after hearing the evidence in the early part of 1937 that
railroads were in need of added revenue in order to provide them with
what might be considered a fair rate of return. Certain increases on
heavy basic commodities such as coal, iron, lime and steel were allowed.
According to Business Week , the Commission in its 10 to 1 decision
38
"virtually invited the roads to ask again for rate readjustments." In
the latter part of 1937 the railroads asked for such rate adjustments.
Specifically they wanted to increase rates by \%. The purpose of the
increase was to provide added revenue so that the railroads could meet
increased operating costs.
The argument against rate increases, especially on agricultural
products was summarized by the Secretary of Agriculture. He said that
farm prices and farm income were still quite low although they had shown
some improvement. He testified that farm prices were likely to remain
low for the next two or three years. It was his opinion that the expected
increase in revenues of the railroads was likely to be offset by a loss
37United States, Interstate Commerce Commission, Reports . "Emergency
Freight Charges, 1935," CCXIX (1936), 565-575.
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"Railroads Want New Rate Boosts," Business Week . October 30, 1937,
p. 1A-.
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in the volume of traffic similar to the loss experienced in the period
1929 to 1932. He stated that the department had found in regard to this
period that:
(1) the bulk of the decline in retail prices during the 1929-
33 industrial depression was taken out of the farmer's share
of the consumer's dollar; (2) the movement of farm products
by rail was reduced because of the tendency of farmers and
shippers, faced with low returns, to seek more advantageous
means of transportation or to utilize their own labor in send-
ing their product to market; (3) the tendency of farmers to
become self-sufficing and to shift from crop production for
direct sale to production of feed crops to be sold indirectly
as livestock and livestock products, also resulted in a lower
volume of farm products for transportation by rail; and (/,.)
the regional balances in farm production were dislocated and
the short-haul movement of farm products by truck was accen-
tuated by the low returns in surplus-producing areas distant
from markets, which, with relatively high transportation
costs, tended to increase production in areas adjacent to
consuming centers. 39
The Secretary concluded that a policy of inflexible rates should be
replaced by a policy of flexible rates which would allow rates to be
lower in depression periods and higher in times of prosperity. He stated
that an increase in rates would tend to add to the existing disparity
between commodity prices and freight rates and tend to retard recovery.
The Commission, after studying the testimony in the case, decided
that a rate increase by the railroads was justified. The increase
granted was 10$ except on all agricultural commodities, which were
increased by % and on the heavy basic commodities, which had been
increased in the previous case. The increased rates became effective in
March, 1938.
The next general rate increase was requested by railroads in 1941,
shortly after the entry of the United States into World War II. The
'United States, Interstate Commerce Commission, Reports . "Fifteen
Per Cent Case, 1937-38," CCXXVI (1938), 91-92.
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railroads claimed that added revenues were needed to meet increased
operating expenses and to allow them to better aid in the war effort.
They specifically asked for a 10% increase on all commodities including
products of agriculture but excluding coal, coke, and iron ore. The
railroads pointed out that total farm income was estimated at $11.2 bil-
lion in 1941 compared with $9.1 billion for 1940. They asserted that
agricultural commodities should receive the same increases as other com-
modities.
Most of the controversy in the case was not over whether or not
rates should be increased but over the amount and method of increase.
Most protestants felt that a general increase was needed but a 10%. increase
was too much. There was considerable controversy regarding the applica-
tion of a general percentage increase. The long-haul shippers argued
that this method placed them at a disadvantage since their rates would go
up disproportionately more than short-haul shipper's. They argued that
a flat increase should be applied. On the other hand the short-haul
shipper regarded his shorter distance as an advantage of location to
which he was entitled.
The increases which were finally granted by the Commission on
different commodities ranged from 3% on agricultural commodities to 6% on
others. The authority to maintain the rate increases was to expire six
months after the end of the war.^°
The above increases became effective in March, 1942. Then in
December of that year, various shippers and public officials filed a
petition asking the Interstate Commerce Commission to reopen the Ex Parte
United States, Interstate Commerce Commission, Reports . "Increased
Railway Rates, Fares and Charges, 1942," CCXLVIII (1942), 545-625.
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14-8 case and remove all or part of the emergency increase granted. The
petitioners argued that railroad revenues had improved substantially
since the increase was granted due to increased traffic and that the
emergency increases were no longer needed by the railroads. They also
argued that the increased rates were in direct opposition to the estab-
lished governmental policy of preventing inflation during the war. The
Commission decided that the emergency rates were no longer needed and
cancelled them for the remainder of 194-3. The Commission reaffirmed
its decision on three different occasions during the remainder of the
war and subsequently suspended the increased rates until six months after
the end of the war.
Post-War Rate Increases
From the end of the war until 1961 there were eight major rate
cases. All of these involved substantial rate increases by railroads.
The result of these rate increases was that freight rates increased by
more than 100^ during this period. In every case, the main contention of
the railroads was that increased operating costs and reduced traffic due
to competition were lowering their revenues and in turn causing a low
rate of return on investment. Prior to World War II the railroads seemed
quite aware of the danger of losing traffic to their competitors and they
appeared to be at least attempting to meet that competition. However,
during the war railroads were relied upon heavily and traffic reached an
all-time high. 1 1 appears that for a time following the war railroads
^Jnited States, Interstate Commerce Commission, Reports . "Increased
Railway Rates, Fares and Charges, 1942," CCLV (194.3), 4-02-405.
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United States, Interstate Commerce Commission, Reports . "Increased
Railway Rates, Fares and Charges, 1942," CCLIX (1944), 159-200.
42
chose to more or less rely on rate increases to maintain adequate revenues.
This is not to say that railroads were not aware of the advances that were
taking place in other modes of transportation but it moans that they were
simply unresponsive to the changing conditions. Nor did all of the fault
lie with the railroads, since Congress and the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission were not willing to alter the regulatory structure in order to
allow railroads to compete effectively. No doubt many of the rate increases
were warranted by the general inflation of prices, but there is reason to
believe that if the railroads had been more alert in lowering operating
costs and adjusting rates to meet competition they could have provided
more efficient transportation at a lower cost while avoiding many of the
problems which began to plague them in the latter part of the 1950's.
This problem will be discussed further in a later section of this paper.
The main purpose of the following discussion is to examine the rate
increases which were instigated after World War II and point out some of
the major issues involved in the various rate cases.
In April, 194-6, the railroads petitioned the Interstate Commerce
Commission for a 25f3 rate increase. The Commission stated that an imme-
diate increase was needed and granted a general increase as authorized in
Ex Parte 14-8. This amounted to a 3% increase on agricultural commodities
and a 6% on all others. The Commission authorized an additional %
increase for all eastern railroads. This was a temporary increase to be
in effect only until the Commission could hear the evidence on the gen-
eral rate increase.
After further hearings in the case, the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion granted a general 2C$ increase on rates which was to be applied in
lieu of the temporary increase authorized earlier. There were some excep-
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tions to the 20% increase and one was grain and grain products. The
increase authorized there was 15$ with the railroads instructed to restore
market and gateway equalizations to adhere to rate break principles in
effect. These adjusted rates were to reflect a 15% increase as nearly as
/ 3possible. The average rate increase in the case when exceptions were
considered was about 17.6$. This was generally more than railroad men
had expected and placed them in a position to earn moderate profits in
194-6.^
The next general rate case to be considered by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission was Ex Parte 166 which was brought about by a petition
by the railroads on July 3, 194-7 for a general increase of 38% within the
eastern territories and 28% in the western and southern territories. The
4.5Commission immediately granted a temporary 10% increase in all rates.
The hearings of the case continued with the railroads demonstrating
that labor costs and costs of materials had risen significantly since the
end of the war. The Commission declared that the railroads needed added
revenues urgently and granted a 20% temporary increase to take the place
of the increase granted in Oct-ober, 194-7.
The hearings in the case continued until August of 1948 when the
final decision in the case was made. The Commission stated that the
greatest need for revenues existed among eastern railroads with the least
United States, interstate Commerce Commission, Reports . "Increased
Railway Rates, Fares and Charges, 1946," CCLXVI (194-6), 537-623.
"Rails Welcome Rate Boost," Business Week . December 14-, 194-6,
pp. 19-20.
Z.5
United States, Interstate Commerce Commission, Reports . "Increased
Freight Rates, 1947," CCLXIX (1947), 35-36.
f
united States, Interstate Commerce Commission, Reports . "Increased
Freight Rates, 1947," CCLXX (1948), 81-82.
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need for added revenues existing among the western railroads. Therefore,
the rate increases granted varied in the different districts. The rate
increases were: (1) 25% within the eastern district, (2) 25% within the
southern district, (3) 25% from, to and within zone 1 of the western trunk
line territory, (4) 20% within the rest of the western district, (5) 25%
between southern and western territories and between them and eastern
territories, (6) 22-g% between zone 1 of western trunk line territory and
rest of western district. These increases were in lieu of all previous
increases granted in this case.
Just six days after the final decision in Ex Parte 166 the rail-
roads filed a petition asking for an increase in rates of 13% with some
exceptions. They stated that operating costs were rising and they would
not be able to earn a fair rate of return on their investment in the
future at current freight rates. The Commission again decided that rate
increases were needed urgently and granted various rate increases averag-
ing 5.2% for the country as a whole.^ The hearings in this case, which
was known as Ex Parte 168, continued until August 2, 1949 when the Inter-
state Commerce Commission concluded the case. The rate increases author-
ized to replace the earlier increases were: (1) 10% within the eastern
district, (2) 10% within the southern district, (3) 9% within zone 1 of
the western trunk line territory, (4) 8% within the rest of the western
territory, (5) 10% between eastern and southern territories, (6) 9%
between territories other than eastern and southern.
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^Jnited States, Interstate Commerce Commission, Reports . "Increased
Freight Rates, 1948," CCLXXTI (1948), 695-790.
49United States, Interstate Commerce Commission, Reports . "Increased
Freight Rates, 1948," CGLXXVI (1949), 9-122.
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After obtaining increases amounting to about 50% since June, 194.6,
the railroads did not ask for further increases until January of 1951.
At that time in Ex Parte 175, the railroads asked for a 6% increase.
The Commission accepted a motion by the railroads to grant emergency
increases and authorized an increase varying from 2 to 4-% in the dif-
ferent districts. The record was held open for further evidence and
the railroads filed an amendment to the original petition asking for a
15% increase instead of the original 6%.
In the further hearings midwestern, eastern, and western shippers
of grain appeared to request that if any increase was granted it be made
uniform throughout the nation. They testified that any inequality of
freight rate increases on grain for the different districts would tend
to disrupt the established grain marketing structure.
The case continued through iMay of 1952 with another interim increase
51
granted in mid-1951. The final increase granted in the case was 15%,
with the increase on grain and grain products being 12%, The increase
was in lieu of earlier rate increases in Ex Parte 175 and was to be
52
applied as a surcharge which would expire on February 28, 1954-. How-
ever, the Commission in 1955 made the rate increase a permanent part of
the rate structure.
Shortly after the previous rate increases were made permanent, the
railroads filed tariffs with the Commission providing for a general 7%
50United States, Interstate Commerce Commission, Reports . "Increased
Freight Rates, 1951," CCLXXX (1951), 179-198.
51
United States, Interstate Commerce Commission, Reports . "Increased
Freight Rates, 1951," CCLXXXI (1951), 557-6^9.
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United States, Interstate Commerce Commission, Reports . "Increased
Freight Rates, 1951," CCLXXXI V (1952), 589-673.
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increase in rates. The tariffs were to become effective on February 25,
1956 unless suspended by the Commission. The Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion issued an order authorizing a 6% increase in rates with some excep-
tions. Among those exceptions were carload rates on grain which could be
increased by %. The rate increase became effective on March 7, 1956.
The Commission, however, continued to conduct hearings on the case, called
Ex parte 196, until May 7.
In these hearings the grain interests (merchandisers, boards of
trade, farmer cooperatives, millers, elevator men, etc.) for the first
time in the previous flurry of rate increases, protested vigorously
against any increases in rates on grain. In the past they had generally
appeared only to ask the Interstate Commerce Commission to maintain gate-
way and port equalizations and to make increases across the nation uni-
form on grain and grain products. They appeared in this case to protest
any increase at all. The grain interests argued that grain traffic was
bearing a disproportionate share of the transportation burden and to
substantiate this they pointed out that car-mile earnings on grain and
grain products had increased by 25.2% since 1948 while the average increase
of all commodities had been only 10%. They asserted also that the economic
conditions of agriculture would not permit a rate increase. They illus-
trated by pointing to the fall in grain prices from the 1947-49 average
to the 1955 price. Finally, the grain interests argued that a rate
increase would result in sufficient diversion of grain from railroads to
trucks and barges so that the railroads would experience a net loss in
revenue rather than a net gain. They introduced statistics illustrating
the recent increase in truck and barge grain traffic and took the posi-
tion that railroad rate increases had led to the increased competition
from other carriers.
LI
The railroads conceded that there was some diversion of grain
traffic to trucks and barges, but they argued that much of it was due to
their inability to provide cars. They also stated that regardless of the
rate level there would be some diversion to other carriers, but even with
some loss of traffic they would still realize additional revenues under
the proposed increases.
After considering the evidence presented in the hearings the Inter-
state Commerce Commission reaffirmed its earlier decision to allow an
53increase of 6% with some exceptions.
In the latter part of 1956 the railroads again asked the Interstate
Commerce Commission for rate increases to cover swelling costs of opera-
tion. These increases were again vigorously opposed by shippers, but the
Commission stated that the railroads urgently needed the rate increases
to maintain revenues. Therefore, the Commission authorized rate increases
in the different territories ranging from 9 to 1A%. The increase author-
5/
ized on grain and grain products in all territories was 9%.
In Ex Parte 206 the Interstate Commerce Commission stated that it
was clear that, by the end of 1957, the railroads would be faced with
further increased costs resulting from a rise in the pay roll tax rate,
wage increases stemming from a cost-of-living adjustment based on the
Consumer Price Index, and increases in the price of materials. The Com-
mission said that when these increases occurred it would entertain a
motion to authorize further moderate increases in rates to meet the added
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United States, Interstate Commerce Commission, Reports . "Increased
Freight Rates, 1956," CCXCVIII (1956), 310-316.
nJnited States, Interstate Commerce Commission, Reports , "Increased
Freight Rates, Eastern, Western, and Southern Territories, 1956," CCC (1957),
633-711
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costs of operation. The Commission suggested further that consideration
should be given to ways of increasing rates other than a general hori-
zontal increase. The percentage increase is the approach that railroads
had used for a good many years when a general increase in revenue was
needed.
On December 23, 1957, the railroads petitioned the Interstate Com-
merce Commission in Ex Parte 212 to permit schedules incorporating selec-
tive rate increases to become effective on February 1, 1958 (later post-
poned to February 15). The Commission allowed most of the increases to
become effective but initiated an investigation to determine the reason-
ableness of the increases. The rate adjustments proposed were generally
percentage increases with a specified minimum or maximum flat rate that
could be applied. For example, the increase on grain and grain products
was 3% subject to a minimum increase of .5$ per 100 pounds. The use of
this type of increase meant that the disadvantage of a percentage increase
to long-haul shippers could be eliminated to a certain extent. The selec-
tive method of increasing rates also allowed the railroads to make rate
increases that would be less likely to cause a diversion of their traffic
to other carriers. This indicated that the railroads were becoming more
aware of the inroads of their competitors and that they were beginning to
attempt to make adjustments to meet that competition.
After further study of the proposed increases, the Interstate Com-
merce Commission permitted them to remain in effect with a few minor
revisions.
^United States, Interstate Commerce Commission, Reports . "Increased
Freight Rates, 1958," CCCII (1958), 665-700.
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In 1961 the railroads once again asked the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission for rate increases. In this case they again proposed specific
flat increases on different products instead of a general percentage
increase. This case was called Ex Parte 223. Although the railroads
had already started to recognize the need of meeting competition from
other carriers, the apparent viewpoint of the rail industry, as in pre-
vious cases, was that rate increases would produce enough extra revenue
to offset the loss in traffic. Even before the increase was proposed,
many railroads had begun making piecemeal rate reductions between points
where competition was strongest. Undoubtedly the railroads believed that
if they could get the general level of rates high enough, then they could
make reductions in competitive situations in order to maintain their
traffic.
The increase proposed and approved on grain and grain products was
.50 per hundred on all rates of 650 or less and 10 per hundred on all
rates of more than 650. This was a fairly small increase, but it was
enough to further weaken the railroads ' competitive position and allow
trucks to move even more rapidly into grain traffic.
The foregoing has been a brief discussion of the general rate
increases by railroads from 1930 to 1961. Table 4 summarizes the rate
increases with respect to grain. The time period was divided into two
TABLE 4.—Changes in freight rates on grain, 1930-1961
Effective Date Increase
Aug 1, 1931 Rate Structure Investigation, Part VII, grain
in the western district-Interstate Commerce
Commission prescribed specific rates, mostly
reductions.
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TABLE 4-.
—
Continued
Effective Date Increase
Oct 22, 1934- Further hearings in grain rate structure
investigation, rates reduced less than pre-
viously authorized
Mar 18, 1933 % Ex Parte 123, increase applies to all grain
and grain products
Mar 18, 1942 % Ex Parte 148, increase was granted for the
length of the war on all agricultural com-
modities
Apr 6, 194-3 The above increase was cancelled for the
remainder of 194-3, the increase was subse-
quently suspended until six months after the
end of the war
July 1, 194-6 % Ex parte 162, the same temporary increase
applied on all traffic, an additional %
increase was granted to railroads in the
eastern district
Jan 1, 194-7 \% Ex Parte 162 continued, increase applied to
all traffic in all districts and replaced the
previous increase in Ex Parte 162
Ex Parte 166, temporary increase on all traf-
fic
Ex Parte 166, another temporary increase to
replace previous increase granted in this case
VJithin the eastern district
within the southern district
from, to, and within zone 1 of western line
territory
within the rest of the western district
between southern and western territories and
between those two and the eastern territories
22^ between zone 1 of western trunk line terri-
tory and the rest of the western district
Final decision in Ex Parte 166-replaced tem-
oorary increases granted earlier
Jan 11, 194-9 6$ Within the eastern district
6% within the southern district
% within zone 1 of the western trunk line terri-
tory.
Oct 13, 1947 10$
Jan 5, 194-8 20£
Aug 21, 1948 • 2%
2%
2%
20$
2%
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TABLE 4-.
—
Continued
Effective Date Increase
l& • within the rest of the western district
6% between the eastern and southern districts
% between districts other than the eastern and
southern
Ex Parte 168, temporary increase
Within the eastern district
within the southern district
within zone 1 of the western trunk line terri-
tory
within the rest of the western district
between the eastern and southern districts
Sept 1, 1949 1056
10%
9%
8%
10%
Sept 1, 1949 9%
Apr U y 1951
Aug 28, 1951 6%
June 1, 1952 12%
Mar 7, 1956 5%
Dec 28, 1956 5%
Feb 4, 1957
Aug 6, 1957 9%
Feb 15, 1958 3%
Between districts other than the eastern and
southern
final decision in Ex Parte 168, increases
replace those granted previously
Ex Parte 175, applied as temporary increase
on grain and grain products in all territories
Ex Parte 175 continued, temporary increase to
replace earlier increase
Ex Parte 175, final increase to replace all
previous temporary increases in this case
Ex Parte 196, increase applied on carload
rates of grain and grain products in all
districts
Ex Parte 206, increase applied on grain in
eastern and western districts only, temporary
increase
The same increase as above was extended to
southern district
Ex Parte 206, final increase to replace all
temporary increases granted previously in
this case
Ex Parte 212, there was a minimum increase of
. 50 on proportional rates and increase applied
only to railroads in the western and eastern
districts with some specified competitive
adjustments exempt from increase
52
TABLE 4-.
—
Continued
Effective Date Increase
Oct 24., I960 Ex Parte 223, increase of .50 on rates of 650
or less and 10 on rates greater than 650
Compiled from various Interstate Commerce Commission Reports foot-
noted earlier in this paper.
indicates date decide
effective date was not available.
d by Interstate Commerce Commission where
parts in order to analyze the increases. The first period was one of
unusual economic conditions with the country going through a serious
depression and a world war. Although, several rate increases were
granted during this period the railroads were not particularly prosperous.
Motor trucks were just beginning to develop as a competitor for railroad
traffic during this period. Table 5 gives the index numbers of railroad
freight rates on wheat as computed by the Agricultural Marketing Service
and published in the Marketing and Transportation Situation . It is seen
that the rates were relatively stable from 1930 to 194-5 in spite of the
fact that several -general increases were granted. This was probably due
to the fact that the railroads did not take all of the increases authorized
or in some cases reduced rates in order to meet increased competition
from motor and water carriers. Another reason is that only two rate
increases applied to agricultural commodities—one in 1938 and the other
in 1942.
The railroads were generally quite interested in meeting the compe-
tition by such actions prior to the war. It is interesting to note that
while the freight rates on wheat were fairly stable, the price of wheat
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TABLE 5.—Index numbers of railroad freight rates on wheat, 1930-1960
(1947-49 = 100 )
a
Year Beginning
Julv
1945
Index
1930 75 1946 76
1931 72 1947 87
1932 75 1948 103
1933 75 1949 110
1934 75 1950 112
1935 72 1951 115
1936 71 1952 123
1937 72 1953 126
1938 75 1954 126
1939 75 1955 126
1940 75 1956 132
1941 76 1957 140
1942 77 1958 144
1943 75 1959 142
1944 75 I960 140
United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing
Service, The Marketing and Transportation Situation . March, 1949, p. 8.
was quite low, especially until 1940. The following table illustrates
the price of wheat, the rail freight rate from Brewster, Kansas to Kansas
City and the ratio of the price of wheat to the freight rate. The average
ratio of price to freight rates for 1924-1929 was 10.5 so the ratio during
1930-1940 was well below the normal.
The economic conditions of the country from 1946 to I960 were also
somewhat unusual. The country experienced a post-war boom which extended
well into the 1950' s including the Korean Conflict. Immediately after the
war the railroads began asking for rate increases to make up for increased
operating costs. From 1946 until i960 the Interstate Commerce Commission
was almost continuously involved in hearings over proposed rate increases
by railroads. As a result freight rates increased steadily from 1946 to
i960 as shown by the freight rate index for wheat in Table 5. The index
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indicates that rail rates on wheat declined slightly from 1958 to I960.
This was probably due to the piecemeal rate reductions which railroads
began to make after 1958 to halt the rapid diversion of grain traffic to
trucks and barges.
TABLE 6.—Comparison of prices of wheat at Kansas City, and rail freight
rates from Brewster, Kansas, 1930-19458
Year Average price
beginning per bushel,
July Kansas City
Cents
1930 76
1931 47
1932 51
1933 88
1934 98
1935 105
1936 121
1937 111
1938 70
1939 74
1940 82
19a 112
1942 126
1943 145
1944 156
1945 160
Rail freight rates
per bushel from
Brewster, Kansas to
Kansas City
Ratio of
price
to rate
Cents
12.3
12.1
12.3
12.3
12.3
12.6
12.6
12.8
13.2
13.2
13.2
13.3
13.4
13.2
13.2
13.2
6.2
3.9
4.1
7.2
8.0
8.3
9.6
8.7
5.3
5.6
6.2
8.4
9.4
11.0
11.8
12.1
United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing
Service, The Marketing and Transportation Situation . April, 1950, p. 8.
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CHAPTER IV
COMPETITION FOR RAILROAD TRAFFIC
Rapid Expansion of Truck Transportation
For almost one hundred years the railroads were the most important
means of inland transportation in the country. In 1920, the total volume
of intercity freight traffic, excluding coastwise and intercoastal ship-
ping, was 500 billion ton-miles. The railroads hauled 8/$ or about HZO
billion ton-miles; inland waterways handled 1% or 75 billion ton-miles;
and motor vehicles hauled less than 1%. In that same year the railroads
provided about 85% of the total intercity passenger traffic. There was
56
virtually no intercity transport by motor or air carriers.
After 1920, motor vehicles began to grow rapidly in importance.
In passenger travel, automobiles soon became the dominant means of inter-
city travel. The development of motor trucks as freight competitors was
slower but still was quite rapid. In 1925 truck registrations reached
2.4 million, but they were used principally in local operation. At that
time it was believed that the main use of trucks would be for local short-
hauls to supplement railroad service. The likelihood of any serious loss
in traffic to motor trucks was considered quite remote by most railroad
men. The Secretary of Agriculture, whose department administered the
Federal Highway Act, stated that he could see no likelihood of competi-
tion with railroads beyond thirty miles except for household goods and a
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few exceptional situations. Not until 1928 did the railroads begin to
Pegrum, Transportation; Economics and Public Policy , p. 31
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Ernest W. Williams, Jr., The Regulation of Rail-Motor Rate Com-
petition (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), p. 3.
56
realize that there was a possibility of encountering some substantial
loss of traffic to the new competitor.
In 1929 the Interstate Commerce Commission estimated that the rail-
roads handled 74.9% of the total intercity ton-miles while trucks handled
3.2%. Therefore, in the nine year period from 1920 to 1929 the railroad
percentage of total intercity ton-miles dropped from 84% to 74.9% while
the percentage handled by trucks climbed from less than 1% to 3.2%.
These estimates were generally made by the Interstate Commerce Commission
from fragmentary data but they serve to illustrate the rapid expansion of
motor truck transport and the corresponding decline in the railroad's
share of national freight movement. By 1932 truck traffic had grown to
5.9% of total intercity ton-miles, largely at the expense of the rail-
roads. This traffic was predominantly short-haul freight, but it was
generally the high class freight from which the largest profits were
derived by railroads.
After 1932, the growth of motor carrier traffic in relation to
total intercity traffic continued but at a slower pace as Table 7 indi-
cates. In 1938 trucks hauled about 8.2% of the total intercity freight
traffic. The percentage increased slightly in 1940 but declined to 6.4%
in 1942. During the remainder of the war truck competition was kept down
partially because of the difficulty in obtaining equipment and parts nec-
essary to maintain them. By 1948 truck traffic was back on its inter-
rupted pre-war trend, handling 11.1% of the total intercity freight traf-
fic in that year. After 1948 the growth of the motor carrier industry
was almost phenomenal. While the railroad's share of freight fell from
61.9% in 1948 to about 46% in 1958, motor carriers increased their share
from 11.1% to 22£. This is not to say that the absolute quantity of
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traffic handled by railroads declined. In fact, the total volume of rail
freight increased from 420 billion ton-miles in 1920 to 596 billion in
1959. However, in this same time period, the total volume of intercity
freight traffic more than doubled from 500 billion ton-miles to over
1,300 billion ton-miles. So it is apparent that, even though the rail-
roads improved their position slightly, they were not able to take advan-
tage of the expanded freight traffic of the country.
TABLE 7.—Comparison of railroad and motor carrier
percentage share of total intercity freight3
Year Railroad rrruck
per cent P qt cent
1920 84.0 1«3SS than 1 .
1929 74.9 3.2
1932 74.3 5.9
1938 65.0 8.2
1940 61.3 10.0
1942 69.5 6.4
1944 68.6 5.4
1946 66.6 9.1
1948 61.9 11.1
1950 56.1 16.3
1952 54.5 17.0
1954 49.5 19.1
1956 48.2 18.7
1958 46.0 22.0
lirnest W. Williams, ,Jr., rhe Regulation of
Rail-Motor Rate Competition (New York:
id James C.
Harper
and Brothers, 1958), p. 4 ai Nelson,
Railroad Transoortation and Publ ic Pol icy (Wash-
ington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1959),
pp. 10 and 439.
The data in Table 7 show that the railroads lost traffic steadily
to motor carriers from 1920 until 1940. During that period the railroads
became quite concerned about the loss of traffic and initiated some steps
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to meet the competition. The railroads increased their rates relatively
little as compared to the period after World V/ar II and in most of the
cases they demonstrated their awareness of truck competition. Many rail-
roads published selective rate reductions to meet truck competition in
specific situations.
However, during the war the railroads regained much of their traffic
and served as the backbone of our nation's transportation system. The
increased traffic and revenue of the war years gave the railroads new
vigor and confidence. After the war, much of the equipment and trackage
of the railroads was in a state of disrepair. The railroads were required
to pay out large sums of money to repair and revitalize their roads. At
the same time the cost of material and labor was rising. The railroads
were in need of added revenue to meet these expenses. In order to obtain
the revenues the railroads initiated a series of general rate increases
which extended through 1958. All through this period of rate increases
the railroads continued to lose traffic to motor carriers.
Each rate increase apparently stimulated the competitors as much as
the railroads since motor carrier rates generally follow rail rates. But
in 1958 the railroads reached the point in their rate increases where it
became apparent that the added revenue of the rate increases was offset
by the loss in traffic to competitors. At that time the railroads began
to generally take stock of the situation and to vigorously attack the
problem. This is probably an oversimplification of the actual situation,
since many railroads were actively engaged in attempts to lower operating
costs and initiate rate reductions all through the period from 194-8 to
1958. There was also a great deal of discussion about the "railroad prob-
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lem," but the railroad industry as a whole took little initiative in
solving the problem and continued to ask for general rate increases.
When the rail carriers did begin to attack the problem they were
met with many difficulties stemming from the regulatory policy of the
country. For instance, in many cases the railroads sought to cease oper-
ations on unprofitable spur lines, but were not allowed to do so because
of the unfavorable effect it would have upon the towns along the lines.
In some cases the railroads asked for permission to do away with unprof-
itable passenger runs but were refused by the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion. The slow and expensive process of litigation before the Commission
hampered the railroads and made it difficult for them to initiate rate
changes which would permit them to compete most effectively. The country
has been experiencing a revolution in its transportation system, and the
railroads have been caught at the very center of this turbulent change.
The future, no doubt, holds many changes in the policies of railroads,
the regulatory agency, and possibly even drastic changes in the marketing
structure of the country.
The Nature of the Competition
There are several important factors which have aided the motor
carriers in their competition with railroads for freight traffic.
The motor carrier industry is one characterized by high direct
cost and relatively low overhead, which places it in direct contrast with
railroads. Its unit of business is the individual over-the-road truck.
Economies of scale seem to be quite modest, so the industry had been
characterized by a large number of small operators. Their ability to
operate profitably depends on securing a regular flow of traffic reasonably
balanced by direction.
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When the individual motor carrier enters the business it has no
obligation to serve all the points on its route or handle all types of
traffic even though it does operate on a common carrier basis within the
limits of its intended scope of operation. As a result, the motor carrier
is able to enjoy the utmost economy per ton-mile because it is able to
concentrate on the class of traffic and length of haul which is most
profitable. Moreover, the motor carriers are able to reduce their rates
on other classes of items between their operating points in order to
achieve the desired volume of traffic. Because of this the motor carriers
have often forced the railroads to make rate reductions in traffic in
which the trucks had little interest other than for maintaining a balance
of freight in each direction.
Motor carriers are not under the same compulsion as railroads to
generate a volume of business. They have no fixed plant comparable to
the railroads which makes it necessary to strive for load capacity in order
to maximize returns. Their owned plant consists of their fleet of motor
trucks and trailers and this can be adjusted over fairly short periods to
allow for changes in the volume of traffic. On the other hand, the rail-
roads have a large investment in rolling stock and engines which cannot be
altered over short periods, thus making it necessary for them to incur the
same maintenance costs in periods of low volume as in periods of high
volume
.
Another characteristic of the motor carrier industry is the large
volume of private and contract carriers. Both elements provide a danger
to motor common carriers as well as to railroads. Contract carriers
generally specialize in carrying certain commodities under contract,
although many of them carry a wide variety of freight. Due to their
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specialization, they are assured of a fairly stable volume of business
under contract. This along with their smaller size, and more lenient
tax treatment in many states allows them to operate at lower rates than
most common carriers. The contract carriers often quote low minimum
rates on backhauls in order to balance their traffic and cover the basic
costs of operation. These low rates on backhauls have a tendency to
lower common carrier rates.
The situation is much the same for private carriers. The owners
may have an imperfect balance in their flow of goods so it becomes prof-
itable for them to quote low rates on backhauls.
Another problem for common carriers is the fact that the shipper
may move the largest part of his freight in his own carrier and move the
balance by common carrier. This aggravates the common carrier's problems
of efficient equipment use since the shipments are generally quite spo-
radic, and at the same time the more profitable regular traffic has been
lost. 58
Another important factor which has aided motor carrier development
has been the construction of thousands of miles of highways across the
nation. These highways were built with public funds, although truckers
insist that they pay for their share of the roads through the various user
taxes which they incur. The recent construction of superhighways with
limited access, especially the Interstate system of roads has been a boost
to the trucking industry.
These several factors along with many others such as faster service
and door-to-door convenience are the things which have allowed motor
viilliams, The Regulation of Rail-Motor Rate Competition , p. 10.
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carriers to take over a large part of the country's short-haul traffic.
The railroads still maintain their supremacy in long-haul traffic but
even there motor carriers have provided some competition.
Competition for Grain Traffic
Before 1950 it was generally believed that the great bulk of com-
mercial grain traffic was not vulnerable to diversion from railroads to
other types of carriers. It was thought that the transportation charac-
teristics of the commodity, plus the advantage of transit arrangements in
rail traffic, would confine competitive carriers to local short-haul move-
ments. This belief did not hold true. After about 1950 motor carriers
and water borne carriers started to make noticeable inroads into grain
transportation
.
A study by the Transportation and Facilities Research Division of
the Agricultural Marketing Service indicated that the rail share of grain
had declined steadily from 1954. to 1958. The study indicated that of the
total shipment of grain from country elevators to regions other than North
Central states the rail share declined from 39% in 1954. to 26% in 1958.
At the same time truck shipment climbed from 58% to 65% and barge ship-
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ments rose from 3% to 9%. This indicates that both barge and truck
shipments of grain from country elevators increased proportionately more
than rail shipments during this time period. Perhaps more important is
the increase in the shipment of grain by truck to inland waterways since
about one half of all grain shipments are made to these markets. In 1956
59United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing
Service, Transportation and Facilities Research Division, Grain Trans-
portation in the North Central Region . 1961, p. 52.
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2% of all shipments to river markets were by truck, but by 1958 this
figure had increased to 21%. This may be due to the growing number of
shipments of grain from country elevators to river markets where further
shipment is made by barge. Most of these shipments originate within
three hundred miles of the markets, although those by rail generally
dominated all shipments of over one hundred miles.
In looking at specific markets, it is evident that trucks have made
larger increases in some markets than in others. For example, the truck's
share of grain shipments received in Kansas City increased from 3% to 8%
between 1954- and 1958, while in Minneapolis their share increased from
IS to lyfo in the same period, and in Chicago the increase was from 8/o to
28^. An Oklahoma study indicated that the truck's share of total grain
traffic from country elevators increased from 28.8% in 1958 to 33.6% in
I960. So apparently the trend is quite widespread and continuing. It
appears that in 1958 the railroads were still holding their share fairly
well in markets receiving predominantly long-haul shipments such as the
Kansas City Market, but they were suffering substantial losses at the
markets with relatively shorter hauls. This is logical since it is a
known fact that the railroads are generally more economical on the longer
hauls than trucks. However, large quantities of grain were shipped to the
river markets from long distances on backhauls by contract and private
carriers.
From 1958 until 1962 the expansion of the motor carrier's share of
grain traffic into Kansas City was phenomenal. It was stated earlier that
60
Ibid., pp. 39-47.
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Adlowe L. Larson and Tom W. Yates, Effect of Motor Trucks on Move -
ment of Wheat in Oklahoma (Stillwater, Oklahoma: Oklahoma State Experi-
ment Station, 1963), p. 5.
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most of the trucked grain was moved to river markets to be shipped out by
barge. This is due to the fact that grain which does not move into a
market by rail must take the flat rate out of the market instead of the
lower proportional rate. Therefore, the increases in truck shipments of
grain were dependent on the development of barge transportation and vice
versa. In 1958, when the rails handled 92% of all grain traffic to Kansas
City, they handled 88% of the wheat shipments out of that market during
the barge season, which extends from the first of April until the last of
November. By 1962 the railroad's share of traffic out of Kansas City
during the barge season had fallen to 48. 5%. This means that during the
eight months of the barging season about 51.5% of the wheat moving into
the Kansas City market was shipped by trucks, since it is generally
assumed that all wheat shipped out by barges has been brought to the mar-
ket by truck. This may not necessarily be the case but it does give an
indication of the loss of traffic by rails both to barges and trucks.
Table 8 shows the changes in barge and rail shipments during the barge
TABLE 8.—Comparison of shipments of wheat from Kansas City
during barge season
19 5 5-19 62
a
„ _. „,. , Rail Shipments Rail Percentage
Barge Barge Shipment „ TT, ,%, . _ m , n ... °
c
& &
TIU * of Wheat During of Total WheatSeason Wheat _ _ & _ __.
Barge Season Traffic
98.0
93.0
92.5
88.0
83.5
77.5
70.5
48.5
Interview with Mr. Ed. Savage, Traffic Manager for Continental
Grain, July 12, 1963
1955 985,400 47,023,200
1956 3,373,921 42,984,000
1957 2,968,226 37,261,800
1958 4,775,430 34,068,600
1959 5,116,438 25,497,000
I960 11,970,212 41,596,200
1961 15,863,425 37,706,680
1962 28,619,156 26,981,980
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season from 1955 to 1962 and the corresponding rail percentage share of
traffic.
There are a number of factors which have influenced the shift from
rails to competing carriers. Probably the most important reason has been
the continued rise in rail freight rates. Since 194-6 rates on grain have
increased by more than 1005$. The increased rates placed truckers in a
position to compete for grain traffic and caused shippers to cast about
for cheaper methods of transportation including added use of water trans-
portation as well as motor carriers.
Another major reason has been the relative decline in importance of
the transit privilege to shippers as evidenced by the changeover to
other modes of transport. It appears that shippers in many cases no
longer feel that the transit privilege is worth the added cost of rail-
road shipment. It may be that the transit privilege is still of major
importance for many shipments but means very little for other shipments
such as exports. Therefore, the shippers are simply talcing advantage of
the lower cost of truck and water borne transportation in instances where
it is possible while utilizing railroad transportation for the remaining
shipments
.
Another factor which has been important in the relative decline in
rail traffic has been poor service; such as box car shortages, inadequate
switching facilities, and greater damage claims in railroad shipments.
The increased demand by truckers for backhauls at low rates has been an
important reason for the switching of country elevators from railroads to
trucks
.
This is not an extensive coverage of the many factors which have
interacted to result in decreasing rail shipments of grain, but these are
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the most important reasons. The increased competition between the various
carriers of grain has resulted in lowered freight rates for shippers in
many cases and will probably result in even lower rates in the future.
In order to accomplish the rate reductions, the entire grain marketing
structure may experience drastic changes. In fact, several rate changes
have already had the effect of altering the market structure and it
appears that more revisions are yet to come.
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CHAPTER V
THE RAILROAD POSITION IN A COMPETITIVE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
As mentioned earlier, for a period of almost one hundred years the
railroads held monopolistic control of inland transportation in the United
States. Inland waterways accounted for some movement, but due to the
limited number of navigable waterways, water carriers were not able to
provide the amount of transportation needed by the growing country.
The railroads began their climb to supremacy in 1830; attained the
pinnacle in about 1920 and held the position without challenge until 1930
when motor carrier competition first began to take form. During the
period from 1887, when the first law regulating railroads was passed,
until 1930 a system of regulation evolved which was quite satisfactory
for the heretofore monopolistic railroad industry. However, after the
advent of motor vehicles as a competitive means of inland transportation,
the railroads were left with something less than monopoly power. There
was scattered recognition of this fact both by railroads and by the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, but the regulatory process continued to regard
the railroads as a monopoly. Even many railroad men believed that rail-
road transportation was and would continue to be the most important means
of transportation in the country. The attitude of railroads in this
respect was mentioned in the section on rate increases. The fact remains
that the railroads did not continue to enjoy a monopoly position, and they
were gradually forced to this realization during the 1950' s as they watched
their traffic being diverted to trucks and barges. The extent of this
diversion was considered in the previous section. The purpose of the
following discussion is to consider the effects of the changing trans-
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portation system on railroads and to examine the steps taken by railroads
in adjusting to the "new" transportation system.
Legitimate Complaints of Railroads
Thus far the discussion has considered the loss of traffic by rail-
roads; the failure of their management to recognize changing conditions
j
and their failure to make operating and rate adjustments to meet the
change. There are a number of factors outside the control of the rail-
roads themselves which have contributed markedly to the decline in rail-
road traffic. These factors should now be considered in order to round
out the discussion on the current position of railroads.
It was mentioned earlier that the regulation of railroads was ini-
tiated because of their monopoly position in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century. However, the railroads did not maintain their
monopoly. The motor carrier industry grew up almost overnight to become
a strong competitor of railroads. On the other hand, the regulatory pol-
icy of the country, just as the railroad's operating policy, changed much
too slowly. The rate system is based on a theory of charging what the
traffic will bear without regard to the cost of service. This was the
method used in the "old days" when railroads were the prime carriers, but
it is not a sound theory on which to base rates in a time when there is
strong competition from other carriers. The industry needs a broad gen-
eral revision of its rate structure taking into consideration cost factors,
competition from other carriers especially private and contract motor car-
riers, and the maintenance of the marketing structure as nearly as pos-
sible. This certainly is a big order, but if the railroad problem is to
be solved these are the problems which will have to be considered.
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Due to the early philosophy of regulation, which has influenced the
Interstate Commerce Commission and national transportation laws down to
the present day, the railroads are closely supervised and often operating
policies are essentially dictated by the Commission. The railroads should
have more freedom in suspending operation of unprofitable lines and adjust-
ing rates. This would allow them to compete effectively for the traffic
which they can move most economically while tending to relegate to other
carriers the traffic which they can handle most efficiently.
By the same token, the laws and procedures which the railroads
must follow in applying adjustments are far outdated. Often the railroads
are required to expend much time and money in hearings before the Inter-
state Commerce Commission. They are met with further delays while the
Commission decides the case. Often these delays extend for years. In
the meantime the railroads must continue to operate under the old condi-
tions while economic factors dictate a change.
Some railroad men argue that the railroads have been relegated to
the position of a "stand-by" industry because of the archaic rules of
regulation by which they are governed. The argument is that shippers
often use other means of transport for the bulk of their high rated ship-
ments and ask railroads to handle the overflow and the lower rated ship-
ments. Alfred E. Perlman, President of the New York Central Railroad,
advocates a system of discriminatory rates whereby the railroads would be
allowed to grant lower rates to large volume shippers. This would allow
railroads to develop a core of loyal customers and obtain a better balance
of traffic. He states that:
Nobody complains about a power company charging a large
user of electricity a lower rate than it charges a small or
occasional user, any more than anyone complains because the
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price of one box of soap in the supermarket is 25 cents and
you can get two boxes for K9 cents. Yet we are told, should
we adopt the same principle, we are discriminating against
the small business!"^
However, the importance of transportation service in the pricing system
and competitive structure of many industries may preclude such an approach.
Since the location of plants in many industries is dependent to a great
extent on the established railroad rate structures, such a policy might
cause drastic change in plant locations. The reason is that large ship-
pers would be granted lower rates and smaller shippers might be required
to relocate closer to the market in order to compete. The question then
becomes whether it is more important to maintain an efficient railroad
system or to continue present policies and avoid disrupting industrial
locations. It should be noted that in recent years there has already
been a strong tendency toward relocation of industries in the United
States. Perhaps this is the time to begin a long-term program to adopt
railroad rate policies to present economic conditions.
The subsidizing of competing forms of transport compounds the rail-
road problem. Although there is considerable controversy over the extent
of subsidization of highway, air, and water carriers, it is generally con-
ceded that all receive some public aid. ^ These subsidies place railroads
at an unfair disadvantage in competing with the subsidized carriers. The
effects of subsidies are to hold rates at an artificially low level for
the subsidized carrier, to encourage an uneconomic allocation of traffic,
and to stimulate the overexpansion of the subsidized transportation facil-
ities
.
f2
Alfred E. Perlman, "Pricing Problems in the Railroad Industry,"
Vital Speeches
. January 15, 1957, p. 213.
"IjOcklin, Economics of Transportation , p. 831.
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The loss of railroad traffic to unregulated carriers was discussed
earlier and will only be expanded upon here. One of the biggest problems
of railroads recently has been the diversion of agricultural commodities
to trucks operating exempt carriers while the railroads are subjected to
strict rate regulation. The railroads complain that the inequality should
be eliminated either by extending the same regulation to motor carriers
or by exempting railroads hauling agricultural commodities. At any rate,
there is general agreement among transportation economists that the ine-
quality should be eliminated in the interest of a more efficient trans-
portation system.
President Kennedy, in his transportation message to Congress in
1962, proposed that railroads be exempt from all minimum rate regulation
Li
to allow them to compete more effectively with other carriers. However,
Congress has not yet taken any formal action and it does not appear likely
that the proposal will be adopted. Many observers believe that a repeal
of minimum rate regulation would result in a siege of fiercely competi-
tive rate cutting not only between railroads and other carriers but also
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among railroads themselves. Such a condition might result in discrim-
inatory practices and disruption of the marketing structure characteris-
tic of the early days of railroading before government regulation.
The Endeavors of Railroads to Meet Competition
Although it has been stated that railroads were generally inactive
in meeting competition from the end of the war until about 1958, this has
^United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing
Service, The Marketing and Transportation Situation . May, 1962, p. 18.
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Interview with Mr. J. S. Chartrand, Transportation Commissioner,
Kansas City Board of Trade, July 13, 1963.
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not been the case since 1958. In fact, some railroads were busy install-
ing technological improvements to reduce costs before 1958. In early
1957, the New York Central opened a 163 mile electronically regulated
stretch of double track between Cleveland and Buffalo. With this new
system two men seated at a control panel can control all the traffic
between the two points. The new system allows two tracks to do the work
of four while increasing the speed of freights from thirty to sixty miles
per hour. In that same year the Pennsylvania railroad was in the midst
of a program to turn the Pittsburgh freight yard into the nation's most
modern electronically controlled freight terminal, Electronic computers
were being installed to sort, classify, route, and guide all freight cars
from an inclined switching hump to their proper tracks. The system was
expected to save the railroad up to 50% in the time for freight cars to
clear the yard plus millions in wages paid to yard crews. These are only
examples of the technological improvements made by railroads in the late
50' s. Since that time numerous other changes have been initiated by
railroads in attempts to cut costs, ranging from new labor saving methods
of track repair to the introduction of modern efficient rolling stock.
In attempts to meet competition the railroads have resorted to selec-
tive rate reductions. By reducing rates between specific points on certain
types of shipments the railroads hope to regain old traffic or at least
maintain existing levels. For example, in 1959 when the St. Lawrence Sea-
way was opened the eastern railroads introduced rate reductions on grain
in an attempt to meet the added export competition of the Seaway. Shortly
thereafter the gulf coast railroads reduced their rates in the same pro-
portion in order to meet the competition.
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A more recent example of such rate reductions is the lowering of
gathering rates on grain to Kansas City from various points in Missouri.
This reduction was made effective in June, 1963. According to recent
reports from railroads, grain shipments have already improved markedly.
At the present time two railroads in Kansas have proposals before
the Western Trunk Line Committee reflecting substantial reductions in
grain gathering rates from points in Kansas to Kansas City. There is a
good chance that other railroads in Kansas will approve the rates and
publish proportional reductions. The rates were first proposed by the
Santa Fe in December of 1962 to make their rates competitive with intra-
state truck rates which had just been reduced. In July, 1963 the Frisco
joined the Santa Fe by proposing proportional rate reductions on its
line in Kansas. Table 9 shows comparative rates between truck and rail-
roads, as proposed by the Santa Fe, and the present rail rates from
selected points in Kansas to Kansas City. It is seen that the proposed
rail rates are generally less than truck rates for the longer hauls, but
a little more than truck rates on the short hauls. However, the approval
of these rates would make railroads quite competitive with trucks in
Kansas.
These "piecemeal" reductions have a tendency to disrupt normal
marketing channels, and are generally looked upon with disfavor by most
shippers. This is especially true of the grain industry where maintenance
of present rate relationships is considered necessary in order to have a
free flow of grain through the markets and thus establish representative
prices in the various markets. Extensive use of piecemeal reductions
could cause many grain shipments to by-pass the major markets in order to
take advantage of lower rates. If this diversion reached large propor-
74
tions the price-making power of the major markets such as Kansas City
and Chicago would be seriously impaired.
TABLE 9.—Statement of Kansas intrastate truck rates present and proposed
rail rates (In cents per hundred pounds) 8
Kansas Origins
Abilene
Adams
Caldwell
Cherryvale
Coffeyville
Concordia
Dodge City
Elkhart
Emporia
Garden City
Great Bend
Hutchinson
Lawrence
Marion
Rolla
Scott City
Ulysses
Wichita
Wheat Rates Wheat Rates
via Truck via Rail
Miles Rate Present Proposed
154- 18£ 34 21
249 26 35i 26
266 27^ 34 24
152 18j 27i 18i
171 20 27i 19i
199 21* 32^- 21
341 33i
4lJ
39 3L*
462 50i 39
110 15 27i
44i
17
381 36 34i
256 26i 38 28
219 23i 35i 24
39 9t 21 12
158 18* 34 21
445 40 50i 37i
372 35 34i 34i
419 36i
22-J-
46 36
208 34 22i
Interview with Mr. J. S. Chartrand, Transportation Commissioner,
Kansas City Board of Trade, July 13, 1963.
Therefore, those in the grain trade advocate that railroads make a
general percentage rate reduction in order to meet competition. This
reduction could be accomplished by "rolling" the rates back to a previous
level, such as the level of rates following Ex Parte 168. This would
mean about a 2% reduction in rates could be accomplished while maintain-
ing present rate relationships. Up until the present time the railroads
have rejected this idea and have continued to make piecemeal reductions.
However, there is hope that in the future the railroads will become aware
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of the value of such reductions both in improving their own revenues and
in maintaining an orderly grain marketing system. '
The railroads have also been experimenting with incentive rates for
heavier loading. Under these conditions the railroads offer lower rates
for large volume shipments. A good example of this is the proposal by
the Southern Railway System to reduee grain rates into the Southeast by
as much as 60$ on five car shipments in their new "Big John" covered hop-
per cars. The rates have been approved by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission and are presently in effect. Under this proposal, there is no
transit privilege accorded the grain in shipment and no corresponding
low rate is granted on grain products such as flour. Therefore, millers
strongly oppose such reductions. They argue that present equal rates on
v/heat and flour and extensive transit privileges allow mills to be com-
petitive at all points between production and consumption areas. They
say that the low bulk rates on wheat without transit will force millers
to relocate at the consumption points in order to compete, the reason
being that by locating at consumption points the mills could take advan-
tage of low rates on bulk grain. Therefore, mills located in surplus
areas such as Kansas would be at a competitive disadvantage due to high
transportation costs. This is a good example of the market disruptions
being brought about by the selective rate reductions of railroads. How-
ever, the lower rates on volume shipments have been fairly successful in
increasing the size of hauls, and it may be possible for the railroads to
publish acceptable compromise incentive rates for both wheat and flour in
order to maintain present mill locations. The trend in railroad equip-
Interview with Mr. J. S. Chartrand, Transportation Commissioner,
Kansas City Board of Trade, July 13, 1963.
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merit is toward larger cars and heavier loading in order to make more
efficient use of the capital investment.
Along with these endeavors, the railroads are generally making other
efforts to strengthen their competitive position. Recently there has
been considerable interest in railroad mergers. The carriers feel that
by combining two or more closely connected roads they can create a system
with an enhanced competitive position. The resulting road is expected to
be financially stronger and the operation of the road is ordinarily
expected to be more efficient by the combining of routes and elimination
of some duplicative services. In some cases the railroads are able to
benefit from economies of scale. Mergers are certainly not a panacea for
all the railroad ills but in many cases they may be quite beneficial.
Although the railroads lost traffic almost constantly from the end
of the war until about 1958, it appears that they have finally become
aware of the competitive powers of water and motor carriers. The fallacy
of their shortsighted policy of applying horizontal rate increases in
order to compensate for loss of traffic has apparently been recognized.
The railroads have now adopted a policy of selectively reducing rates to
meet particular competitive situations. The number of such reductions has
been increasing steadily so that the average level of rates has fallen
considerably since 1958. As a result, the railroads have been able to
hold their own in some cases but generally the loss of traffic to other
carriers continues to be a major problem. The future undoubtedly holds
many major adjustments for railroads, but as the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission stated in 1933 when the trucking industry was just beginning to
show signs of power "the country is not ready to abandon its rail-
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CO
roads." The goal is to readjust and reorganize the railroads as well
as their regulatory body so that they more perfectly conform to the
economic conditions of today.
United States, Interstate Commerce Commission, Reports . "General
Rate Level Investigation, 1933," CXCV (1933), 71.
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SUMMARY
About 1830, the railroads began their climb to supremacy as the
major mode of inland transportation in the United States. By 1916 they
had reached the peak and were, by far, the dominant means of transporta-
tion in the country.
They were able to maintain this position until about 1930 when
competition from motor carriers first became significant. From that
time until the present the railroads' share of traffic has diminished
steadily.
From their earliest development until about 1950, the railroads
were considered to be the primary means of transporting grain. Therefore,
the structure of the grain marketing system was built around rail freight
rates to eastern consuming areas.
The grain rate structure which developed was one which was char-
acterized by "rate breaks" at the major markets such as Kansas City,
Chicago, Minneapolis, and St. Louis.
The Interstate Commerce Commission endorsed this method of con-
structing grain rates in the Rate Structure Investigation, Part VII,
and prescribed rates from specific gathering points in the producing
states to the major markets. These rates were considered to be fair and
non-discriminatory and are the basis of present rail rates.
Between 1930 and 1961 the railroads asked for eleven major rate
increases. In most of the cases the railroads were granted some increase
by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The adjustments were made in the
form of general percentage increases up until 1958. Rate adjustments
since that time have been in the form of flat increases.
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With each rate increase motor and water competition became stronger.
As the railroads' costs went up and their share of the traffic went down,
they sought to solve their revenue problems by general rate increases
which had the effect of perpetuating their troubles. While the water
carriers' percentage share has been fairly stable, the motor carriers
have significantly Increased their share of freight traffic, and rails
have experienced a drastic decline in the percentage of freight handled.
This loss has been especially noticeable in grains since 1950.
Thus the transportation system of the country has changed from one
characterized by a railroad monopoly in 1920 to one characterized by
strong competition between several modes of transport at the present time.
Railroad regulatory policy has not changed accordingly. The railroads are
still governed by laws and procedures which were developed for a monopo-
listic industry. The railroads argue that in order for them to compete
in the present transport system, they need more freedom in setting rates,
changing operating policies, and generally in managing their businesses.
After about 1958, the railroads apparently began to realize that
they could not continue to ask for rate increases to offset their loss in
traffic. Since that time the railroads have made several gestures which
indicate that they are ready to compete for the freight traffic. Many
railroads have invested large sums of money in technological improvements
to reduce operating costs. Selective rate reductions by railroads have
been quite common in areas of strong motor carrier competition in the past
few years.
It appears that the changes which have occurred in the transporta-
tion system of the country may necessitate major changes in regulatory
policy and possibly even some major changes in the marketing structure of
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the nation. The pressures of selective rate reductions on grains have
already been acknowledged by the grain trade, and steps have been taken
to persuade the railroads to maintain the present rate structure. Whether
or not the present grain rate structure will be maintained should be
determined within the next few years as the railroads continue their
campaign to hold and even regain lost traffic.
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This report had two major purposes. The first was to present a
general review of the development of rail freight rates on grain in the
United States. The second purpose of the Report was to analyze the
resulting changes in the transportation system and to examine the factors
which influenced those changes with reference to grain and grain products.
The grain rate structure of the United States developed from sev-
eral basic factors. The first was the characteristic east-west flow of
grain by railroad from surplus producing areas to eastern consumption
points. The second factor was the evolution of equal rates for grain
and grain products, e.g. wheat and flour. The other factor was the
granting of transit privileges, whereby, grain could be stopped in
transit for storing or processing and then continued on to the destina-
tion at the lower through rate.
The resulting rate structure was characterized by "rate breaks" at
the major markets with equalization rates between those markets in order
to promote the free flow of grains from all producing regions.
This basic rate structure, with some minor modifications by the
Interstate Commerce Commission, has remained effective up to the present
time. However, the actual rates have been increased by more than 100$
since 1930. All but two of the eleven rate increases granted to rail-
roads from 1930 to 1961 were general percentage increases. Such adjust-
ments were supposed to maintain existing rate relationships. Grain men
argued that the rate structure was being distorted by the greater pro-
portional increase on long-haul rates than on the shorter hauls. There-
fore, the increases granted to railroads in 1958 and i960 were flat rate
increases.
The numerous rate increases sought by railroads from 1930 to 1961
were a boon to the young and rapidly developing motor carrier industry.
As rail rates constantly climbed higher, the motor carriers' share of
freight steadily grew. Since 1950, the trucks have continuously increased
their share of grain handled. Another important factor has been the
improvement of barge transportation. The truck-barge combination has
taken much of the rail grain traffic in recent years.
The transportation system of today is characterized by strong
competition. The result of this competition will, undoubtedly, be lower
freight rates to producers and shippers. However, there may be some
undesirable repercussions on the grain rate structure.
The railroads have already started making selective rate reductions
and lower incentive rates which have a tendency to destroy the historic
grain rate pattern. It now appears that more rate reductions are inev-
itable. The grain trade is making a strong effort to insure that future
reductions will be of a character which will maintain present rate rela-
tionships.


